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TIME, INC. v. FIRESTONE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
RESTRICTIVE NEW LIBEL RULING
In 1967, Russell Firestone was granted a divorce from his wife,
Mary Alice. This action marked the end of a seventeen-month trial
which had become a cause celebre in social circles across the
country. Mary Alice originally sought separate maintenance, and
Russell counterclaimed for divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty
and adultery. In granting the divorce, the trial judge stated that
"neither party is domesticated" and found the equities of the case
to favor Russell Firestone.'
Shortly thereafter, Time reported the divorce in the "Milestones"
section of the magazine, listing the grounds as extreme cruelty and
adultery.2  Mary Alice Firestone brought a successful libel suit
against Time, claiming that the divorce had not been granted on
the ground of adultery. Five years after publication of the "Mile-
1. The relevant portions of the court's final judgment read:
According to certain testimony in behalf of the defendant, extra-
marital escapades of the plaintiff were bizarre and of an amatory
nature which would have made Dr. Freud's hair curl. Other testi-
mony, in plaintiff's behalf, would indicate that defendant was guilty
of bounding from one bedpartner to another with the erotic zest
of a satyr. The court is inclined to discount much of this testi-
mony as unreliable. Nevertheless, it is the conclusion and finding
of the court that neither party is domesticated ....
In the present case, it is abundantly clear from the evidence of
marital discord that neither of the parties has shown the least
susceptibility to domestication, and that the marriage should be
dissolved.
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. That the equities in this cause are with defendant, that defend-
ant's counterclaim for divorce be and is hereby granted, and
the bonds of matrimony which have heretofore existed be-
tween the parties are hereby forever dissolved.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 450-51 (1976).
2. The full text of the "Milestones" report is as follows:
DIVORCED. By Russell A. Firestone, Jr., 41, heir to the tire for-
tune: Mary Alice Sullivan Firestone, 32, his third wife; a onetime
Palm Beach schoolteacher, on grounds of extreme cruelty and adul-
tery; after six years of marriage, one son; in West Palm Beach,
Fla. The 17-month intermittent trial produced enough testimony
of extramarital adventures on both sides, said the judge, "to make
Dr. Freud's hair curl."
TiME, Dec. 22, 1967, at 77.
stones" item, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the divorce
decree and upheld it on the ground of extreme cruelty only.3 Two
years later, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Mrs. Firestone's
$100,000 libel judgment against Time.4
Time appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that
the judgment violated its first amendment rights. Time asserted
that because Mrs. Firestone was a public figure and the report con-
cerned a judicial proceeding, actual malice must be shown. Ad-
ditionally, Time maintained that because Mrs. Firestone claimed no
harm to her reputation, she could neither base her suit on defa-
mation nor recover damages for mental suffering alone.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court stated that Time's
report "may well be ... the product of some fault" by Time's
staff.5 In addition, it held that no constitutional privilege was
available to Time because Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure0
and because reports of judicial proceedings were not entitled to a
constitutional privilege.7 Finally, although Mrs. Firestone with-
drew her claim for damage to her reputation, the Court found she
could recover solely for her mental anguish.8
The news media view the Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone9 as a further erosion of press protections. 10 The decision
makes it dangerous for the media to report judicial proceedings in
any meaningful manner and limits the press' investigative efforts.
More basically, the case represents a fundamental shift in the
balance the Court had meticulously constructed in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc." In that case, the Court attempted to accommodate
3. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972).
4. Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974). This was the sec-ond time the Florida Supreme Court considered the case. Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 231 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970), rev'd and remanded,
254 So. 2d 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), quashed and remanded, 271 So.
2d 745 (Fla. 1972), reaff'd prior holding on other grounds, 279 So. 2d "389
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated and
remanded, -424 U.S. 448 (1976).
5. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 463 (1976).
6. Id. at 455.
7. Id. at 456.
8. Id. at 460.
9. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
10. Waters & Comper, Private Lives, NEwswEEK, MAR. 15, 1976, at 66;
Who Is A Public Figure?, TIME, Mar. 15, 1976, at 66; Libel Case Goes Against
'Time,' Makes Life Tougher for Journalists, BROADCASTING, Mar. 8, 1976, at
36. One periodical stated that the Firestone decision "plunges the field of
libel from the chilling level of uncertainty created by Gertz into the cold
certainty of self-imposed censorship." Pilpel & Rochett, Supreme Court
Ruling in Firestone Case is a New Danger to Press Freedom, PUBLISHER'S
WEEKLY, Mar. 29, 1976, at 39.
11. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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both the public interest in a free press and the injured plaintiff's
need for compensation. The Firestone decision undermines the
Gertz balance, creating serious practical consequences for the news
media. This Comment will examine the doctrinal significance of
Firestone and its probable effect on news media practices. The
analysis is prefaced by a brief review of libel law: the theory of
liability, the defenses, and the damages rules.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIBEL LAw
The Common Law of Libel
Courts have historically protected a person's interest in a good
reputation.12 At common law, a libel plaintiff recovered on a
theory of strict liability.'3 The plaintiff had to prove only the
defamatory statement and show that the defendant was responsible
for its publication.' 4 The plaintiff did not have to prove the state-
ment false. The interest protected was the plaintiff's reputation.
Consequently, courts focused on the effect of the statement on third
12. The Papyrus of Hunefer lists slander as one of the 42 offenses
recognized by ancient Egypt. Slander was expressly forbidden by the law
of Moses and by the ancient Romans. Under King Alfred of England a
slanderer could lose his tongue, and the Normans made a slanderer pub-
licly confess himself a liar while holding his nose.
In England, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over defamation,
which was considered a sin. Libel developed primarily as a criminal action
for seditious words or writings, triable before the infamous Star Chamber,
a political tribunal set up to punish people who made statements tending
to produce discord between the king and his subjects. Those people were
punished even if the statements were true. The nobility were presumed
to have good reputations, hence, the rule of presumed damages. After the
Court of Star Chamber was abolished, the jurisdiction over libel was trans-
ferred to the common law courts. However, the courts retained the intri-
cate rules developed over the centuries, notably strict liability and pre-
sumed damages. For a discussion of the history of libel law, see M. NEWELL,
LIBEL AND SLANDER 2-4 (2d ed. 1898); Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of
Slander and Libel, 36 Am. L. REV. 552 (1902); Eaton, The American Law of
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analyti-
cal Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eaton]; Holds-
worth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 40 LAw Q.
REV. 302 (1924); Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation,
3 COLUm. L. REV. 546, 570-71 (1903); Developments in the Law-Defama-
tion, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875 (1956).
13. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 113, at 772 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PRossER]. The rule of strict liability and the rule of presumed
damages were abolished by the Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
14. PRossER, supra note 13, at § 114, at 776.
persons and not on the plaintiff's own humiliation or mental suf-
fering.15
Even if the plaintiff made a prima facie case for liability, the
defendant could resort to several defenses. Some were absolute,
such as the defense of truth.16 Other defenses in the nature of
qualified privileges developed. 17 Because courts have long recog-
nized society's interest in robust public debate, several qualified
privileges developed to protect the freedom of the debate. These
qualified privileges afforded the defendant substantial protection
from libel suits by requiring proof of actual malice.'8
One qualified privilege was the right to report official pro-
ceedings.19 Most states required the report to be fair and accurate,
although a substantially accurate summary was sufficient.2 ° The
15. Id. § 111, at 737.
16. Truth is a complete defense to a libel suit in all but 11 states, which
additionally require that the publication be made with good motives. Con-
sent is another complete defense. In addition, in certain areas the law
grants absolute privileges to defame because society's interest in uncen-
sored communication outweighs its concern for an individual's reputation.
Absolute privilege attaches to statements made by any participant in a judi-
cial proceeding, administrative proceeding, or grand jury proceeding, and
to statements made in legislative hearings. 1 A. HANSoN, LIBEL AND RELATED
TORTS §§ 108-16 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HANSON]. See also Note, Abso-
lute Immunity in Defamation, 9 CoLum. L. REv. 463 (1909). Federal offi-
cials have an absolute privilege to defame while acting within their official
duties. Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1969). Generally, state officials have
this same privilege. E.g., Blair v. Walker, 64 Ill. 2d 1, 349 N.E.2d 385
(1976); Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952). See Handler
& Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government
Officials, 74 HARv. L. REV. 44 (1960). A publisher may claim absolute privi-
lege if publication is required by law. E.g., Becker v. Philco Corp., 234 F.
Supp. 10 (E.D. Va. 1964), aff'd, 372 F.2d 771 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 979 (1967). Conversations between a husband and wife are privileged
as are statements made to officials of the Catholic Church. Cimijotti v.
Paulsen, 230 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Iowa 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 613 (1965); HAN-
SON, supra note 16, at 123.
17. In addition to the qualified privileges discussed in the text, other rec-
ognized privileges encompass statements which a publisher deems necessary
to protect his own reputation and statements made to protect persons other
than the publisher. A conditional privilege is also recognized for state-
ments published to protect a common interest, such as those made by a
labor union. See PRossEn, supra note 13, at § 115, at 785-91; Note, Privileged
Defamation, 22 VA. L. REV. 642 (1936).
18. Bradford v. Mahon, 219 Kan. 450, 548 P.2d 1223 (1976); General Mo-
tors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976).
19. This privilege is limited to a release from liability for the repetition
of defamatory matter appearing in the official report or proceeding. HAN-
soN, supra note 16, at § 134.
20. E.g., Edmiston v. Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (sub-
stantially fair); Whitcomb v. Hearst Corp., 329 Mass. 193, 107 N.E.2d 295
(1952) (mistake in name); Rhodes v. Star Herald Printing Co., 173 Neb.
496, 113 N.W.2d 658 (1962).
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privilege encompassed reports of judicial proceedings, including
divorces.
21
In addition, the defendant could rely on the traditional privilege
to comment on matters of public interest. Traditionally, fair com-
ment has been allowed about public officials, 22 community leaders
from the private sector,23 and celebrities such as artists24 and
athletes. 25 In most states, the privilege covered only statements
of opinion. Any facts stated had to be true.26 Some courts recog-
nized a privilege of good faith misstatement of fact in communi-
cations to the public about matters of vital public interest. These
courts reasoned that the public interest in robust debate demands
that the press furnish information without fear of a lawsuit.
2 7
However, the majority of states did not recognize that privilege,
28
rationalizing that such criticism would deter desirable candidates
from seeking public office.29
If the plaintiff established a prima facie case for liability and the
defenses failed, the plaintiff could recover damages. Damages were
presumed in a case of libel per se-that is, when the words were
clearly defamatory on their face.30 Courts presumed that such state-
21. Rhodes v. Star Herald Printing Co., 173 Neb. 496, 113 N.W.2d 658
(1962); Acquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
22. E.g., Bailey v. Charleston Mail Ass'n, 126 W. Va. 292, 27 S.E.2d 837
(1943); PROssER, supra note 13, at § 118, at 822.
23. E.g., Klos v. Zahorik, 113 Iowa 161, 84 N.W. 1046 (1901).
24. E.g., Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335 (D.C. App. 1965).
25. Conkwright v. Globe Publishing Co., 398 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965); cf. Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine & Broadcasting, Inc., 328 F.2d 869
(9th Cir. 1964) (privilege held inapplicable because writer did not purport
to give his analysis).
26. E.g., Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publishing Co., 218 F.2d
612 (9th Cir. 1954); Venn v. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 47
(M.D. Tenn. 1962); Lorillard v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 65 Ill. App. 2d 65,
213 N.E.2d 1 (1965). See Note, Fair Comment, 62 HARv. L. REV. 1207 (1949).
27. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921);
Charles Parker Co. v. Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440
(1955); Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corp., Inc., 185 Kan. 61, 340 P.2d 396
(1959); Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
28. E.g., Owens v. Scott Publishing Co., 46 Wash. 2d 266, 284 P.2d 296
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 968 (1956). One writer listed 26 states follow-
ing the majority view. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates,
49 COLuM. L. REV. 875, 896-97 (1949).
29. E.g., Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); State
Press Co., Inc. v. Willet, 219 Ark. 850, 245 S.W.2d 403 (1952).
30. PROSSER, supra note 13, at § 112, at 762. The rule of presumed dam-
ages is no longer constitutionally permissible. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
ments injured the plaintiff's reputation. However, a different rule
applied in a case of libel per quod, when a reader must have ad-
ditional information to recognize the defamatory nature of the
statement. In libel per quod, plaintiff had to allege special damage,
usually pecuniary loss, before damage to reputation was presumed. 1
In either libel per se or libel per quod, the defendant could intro-
duce evidence in mitigation of damages, such as evidence of plain-
tiff's prior bad reputation.32
The Constitutional Law of Libel
In 1964, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,33 the Supreme Court
created a constitutional privilege for media defendants. The Court
held that first amendment protections for speech and press limit a
state's power to award damages in a libel action by a public official
against critics of his official conduct.34  Since New York Times,
public officials must show actual malice to recover. The plaintiff
must prove either that the publisher knew the statements were false
or that he displayed a reckless disregard for the truth.35 The Court
31. PRossER, supra note 13, at § 112, at 762. For two views on whether
the plaintiff must prove special damages in libel per quod, see Eldridge,
The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HAIRv. L. REv. 733 (1966); Prosser,
More Libel Per Quod, id. at 1629.
32. Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921); Sclar
v. Resnick, 192 Iowa 669, 185 N.W. 273 (1921); C. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES
§ 119 (1935). Only evidence of a generally bad reputation existing prior
to publication is allowed. Evidence of misconduct tending to show bad
character is not allowed. See Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa
1968). But see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF REMEDiES § 7.2 (1973).
In addition, some jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to show partial truth in
mitigation of compensatory damages, and plaintiff may not recover for por-
tions which are substantially true. Turnbull v. Herald Co., 459 S.W.2d 516
(Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Coraki v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d
899 (1971).
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). For a discussion of the historic events under-
lying New York Times, see Pierce, The Anatomy Of An Historic Decision:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C. L. REv. 315 (1965). A general
discussion of the case is found in Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-
A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. Rsv. 1 (1965); Brennan, The Su-
preme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment,
79 HAuv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of
Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. REv. 581 (1964).
34. 376 U.S. at 283.
35. Id. at 279-80. The New York Times standard requires evidence of
the defendant's state of mind: "There must be sufficient evidence to permit
the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication." St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731
(1968). Legal scholars have recognized a serious flaw in the actual malice
standard in that only a review of the evidence by the Supreme Court can
finally determine whether actual malice exists. See HANsoN, supra note
16, at § 152.
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reasoned that the defense of truth did not provide adequate pro-
tection for the press. The threat of large lawsuits would deter the
press from publishing information which was not provably true, or
which, even if provably true, might prompt expensive libel
litigation."0 That threat of press self-censorship led to the new
constitutional privilege.
Although Dean Prosser proclaimed this case "the greatest vic-
tory won by defendants in the law of torts,137 the victory was a
limited one. Plaintiffs could still rely on strict liability and pre-
sumed damages. However, the new defense of constitutional privi-
lege afforded media defendants substantial protection from libel
suits.38 The holding of New York Times was expansive. It was not
long before the Court extended the privilege to statements concern-
ing lower level officials. 39 Three years later, the privilege was
widened to include public figures. 40 Supreme Court decisions found
a college athletic director,41 a candidate for public office,42 a retired
army general, 43 and a local real estate developer 44 to be public
figures.
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,45 the Supreme Court made
the final extension of the New York Times rule. It expanded the
actual malice standard to all areas of public interest. Now a private
36. 376 U.S. at 279.
37. PRossER, supra note 13, at § 118, at 819.
38. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REv. 422,
430 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Anderson].
39. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966). Justice Douglas argued that
the actual malice standard should apply to influential private citizens:
Yet if free discussion of public issues is the guide, I see no way to
draw lines that exclude the night watchman, the file clerk, the
typist, or, for that matter, anyone on the public payroll .... And
the industrialists who raise the price of a basic commodity? Are
not steel and aluminum in the public domain?
Id. at 89 (Douglas, J., concurring).
40. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Court noted:
Since the depression of the 1930's and World War II there has been
a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a merging of science,
industry, and government, and a high degree of interaction between
the intellectual, governmental and business worlds .... [P] ower
has also become much more organized in what we commonly con-
sidered to be the private sector.
Id. at 163.
41. Id.
42. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
43. Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
44. Greenbelt Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
45. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
defamation plaintiff, involved in an area of public concern, could
not recover except on a showing of actual malice. Rosenbloom
created a "newsworthiness" test to protect a publisher whenever
the topic was a matter of public interest.46
For ten years the Court consistently expanded the New York
Times rule. Then in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,47 it sharply cur-
tailed the use of the actual malice standard. Moreover, while the
prior constitutional law had dealt only with defenses to libel actions,
in Gertz the Court began to comprehensively restructure libel law.
For the first time, changes were made in the underlying theory
of liability. The Gertz Court abolished strict liability in libel
actions even when -private plaintiffs were involved. States were
allowed to define their own standard for recovery, so long as they
did not impose strict liability.48
Simultaneously, the Court limited the use of the constitutional
privilege. The Rosenbloom "newsworthiness" test was abandoned.
Publishers may now rely on the actual malice standard only when
discussing public officials and public figures. 49 The Court defined
two types of public figures. The first category includes a person
who achieves "such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a
public figure for all purposes and in all contexts."5 ° The second
category encompasses the individual who "voluntarily injects him-
self or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues."' '  When a
publisher discusses a private plaintiff, the constitutional privilege is
no longer available, even if the plaintiff's conduct is newsworthy.
Finally, the Court imposed limitations on libel damages, a-
bolishing presumed and punitive damages, at least when liability is
not based on actual malice.52 Defamation plaintiffs are restricted
to compensation for actual injury.53 The Court did not define this
46. Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming News-
worthiness Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 371, 376 (1970).
For the news media reaction, see Coonradt, The Law of Libel Has Been All
But Repealed, THE QuILL, Feb. 1972, at 24.
47. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
48. Id. at 347.
49. Id. at 343.
50. Id. at 351. The Court referred to this group as those "who, by reason
of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which
they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures
...." Id. at 342.
51. Id. at 351.
52. Id. at 349.
53. Id.
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term,54 but it said that "the more customary types of actual harm
inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation
and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering."55 The Court voiced its hostility toward
"gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of actual in-
jury."5 0 Although libel actions had traditionally been brought to
vindicate reputation, 57 the compensation rationale formed the basis
of the opinion.
The Gertz Court consciously balanced the need for a vigorous and
uninhibited press with the states' interest in redressing harm to
reputation. The Court stated:
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake in defama-
tion suits by private individuals allows the States to impose liabil-
ity on the publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a
less demanding showing than that required by New York Times.
This conclusion is not based on a belief that the considerations
which prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege for
defamation of public officials and its extensions to public figures
are wholly inapplicable to the context of private individuals.
Rather, we endorse this approach in recognition of the strong and
legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for
injury to reputation.
58
In striking that balance, the Court made concessions to both libel
plaintiffs and defendants. On the one hand, plaintiffs benefitted
by a limitation on the scope of the constitutional defense. Private
individuals no longer needed to prove actual malice to recover
damages. The actual malice requirement had been a formidable
barrier precluding jury consideration of many cases brought by
private individuals.59 On the other hand, the news media benefit-
ted by the abolition of strict liability and presumed and punitive
damages. Libel recoveries were limited to those plaintiffs who
could prove negligence and actual injury to reputation.6 0 Such
54. Id. at 349-50.
55. Id. at 350. Justice Brennan observed that the opportunity, for juries
to punish unpopular opinions remained: "[T]he Court's broad-ranging ex-
amples of 'actual injury' . . . inevitably allow a jury bent on punishing ex-
pression of unpopular views a formidable weapon for doing so." Id. at 367
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 349.
57. Eaton, supra note 12, at 1431-32. See also Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT
AND MASS COMMUNICATIONs 105-07 (1947).
58. 418 U.S. at 348-49.
59. See Anderson, supra note 38, at 472-73.
60. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 12, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
limitations promised both to confine recoveries to deserving plain-
tiffs who could prove damage as a result of a libelous publi-
cation and to eliminate harassment of the press by frivolous libel
suits.61
The Gertz case received praise as an equitable resolution of the
tension between freedom of the press and compensation to injured
plaintiffs. 2  However, the balance was achieved mainly at the
expense of press protections and was a significant retrenchment
from the line of decisions since New York Times. 3 The language
of Gertz suggested that the Court regarded the balance struck there
as its definitive pronouncement in the libel area." Yet no sooner
had the Court achieved a tolerable balance in Gertz, than it pro-
ceeded to upset that balance in Firestone.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone-THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE
In rejecting Time's claim for first amendment protection, the
Supreme Court touched on every aspect of libel law-the theory of
liability, the defenses and privileges, and the limitations on dam-
ages. The Court's treatment of each aspect of libel law will be
given separate consideration.
The Negligence Standard
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Florida court
because it determined that Florida courts had not made a finding
of fault as required by Gertz.65 Nevertheless, the Court stated:
"It may well be that petitioner's account in its 'Milestones' section
448 (1976). The Gertz Court emphasized that reputation is the protected
interest-e.g., "the state law right to compensation for wrongful hurt to
one's reputation," 418 U.S. at 343; "adverse impact on reputation," id. at
344; "the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for
wrongful injury to reputation," id. at 348; "the strong and legitimate state
interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputa-
tion," id. at 348-49 (emphases added).
61. See 418 U.S. at 349-50.
62. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199 (1976); Comment, The Law of
Libel-Constitutional Privilege and the Private Individual: Round Two-
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 12 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 455 (1975).
63. See Anderson, supra note 38; Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to
Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amend-
ment, 26 HAsInmGs L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton, supra note 12. The publishing
industry regarded the case as a retrenchment. See Pilpel & Rochett, Libel,
Advertising and Freedom of the Press, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Mar. 1, 1976,
at 46.
64. 418 U.S. at 354 (Blacknun, J., concurring).
65. 424 U.S. at 464.
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was the product of some fault on its part .... 66 and "[e]ven
where a question of fact may have constitutional significance, we
normally accord findings of state courts deference in reviewing con-
stitutional claims here."67 The Court strongly suggested that it
would be willing to uphold a finding of negligence in this case.
Nonetheless, there was considerable evidence of reasonable care
on the part of Time.68 The divorce decree was rendered late Friday
afternoon and Time's deadline was Saturday. Time received a wire
service account of the divorce stating that Russell Firestone had
been granted a divorce from Mary Alice, whom "he had accused of
adultery and extreme cruelty." That account was substantially re-
printed in the New York Daily News.6 9 Excerpts of the divorce
decree referred to charges of adultery by both parties. Time's Palm
Beach "stringer" 70 reported that Mrs. Firestone's attorney had told
him the technical ground for the divorce had been extreme cruelty
and adultery.71 The divorce decree was so ambiguous that the two
appellate courts reviewing it came to different conclusions about the
grounds for divorce.7 2 The Florida Supreme Court found the decree
had been awarded on a ground not recognized in Florida, lack of
domestication. However, that court upheld the divorce, citing evi-
dence of extreme cruelty.
73
The evidence of reasonable care by Time did not go unnoticed
by members of the Supreme Court.74 Nevertheless, given the lan-
66. Id. at 463.
67. Id.
68. Justices Powell and Stewart wrote a concurring opinion in which
they stated their reaction to the record. They found substantial evidence
that Time was not guilty of negligence. Because the Court remanded the
case to the Florida court for a determination of negligence, Justices Powell
and Stewart did not find it necessary to decide whether the evidence estab-
lished Time's due care. Id. at 469 (Brennan & Powell, JJ., concurring).
69. 424 U.S. at 466.
70. Because no news service can provide reporters in every town, string-
ers, or part-time reporters, are often contacted to cover local stories. Often
the reporters work for several news organizations or for a local newspaper
and "string" on occasion for major news services. See Vandenberg v.
Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1028 n.5 (5th Cir. 1975).
71. Mrs. Firestone's attorney denied that he made these statements. Re-
spondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 8, Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976).
72. The Florida district court upheld the divorce decree of the trial court.
Firestone v. Firestone, 249 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1971). The Florida Supreme
Court, however, found that the divorce had been granted on grounds of ex-
treme cruelty. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972).
73. Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1972).
74. See note 68 supra.
guage of the majority opinion, it appears that in the future the Court
may sustain a jury finding of negligence in such a case. If a finding
of negligence is permissible in a case like Firestone, the negligence
standard will afford the media little protection. Indeed, Firestone
suggests that the Gertz negligence standard differs little in practice
from the old theory of strict liability.
75
The Defense of Constitutional Privilege
Time asserted that even if there was a prima facie case of lia-
bility, it had a constitutional defense: Mrs. Firestone had to estab-
lish that the publication was made with actual malice-with knowl-
edge of the falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Time
advanced two arguments in support of this contention. First, Time
argued that Mrs. Firestone was a public figure. Second, Time main-
tained that reports of judicial proceedings deserve the protection of
the actual malice standard. The Supreme Court rejected both argu-
ments.
In holding that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure, the Court
did not discuss the first type of public figure described in Gertz-
that is, a person who has achieved "such pervasive fame or notoriety
that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts. '76 Instead, the Court focused on the second category of
public figures, those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution
of the issues involved."
77
Time presented ample evidence to support its argument.78 Mrs.
Firestone was prominent among the "400" of Palm Beach society.
She received enough press attention to warrant subscription to a
press clipping service. The seventeen-month divorce trial attracted
75. The Florida Supreme Court called the case a "flagrant example of
'journalistic negligence.'" Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 305 So. 2d 172, 178 (Fla.
1974). See Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975). In this case the court upheld a $250,000
award even though the statements were apparently true. An alternative
result is suggested by Professor Keeton. He argues that to recover for defa-
mation, all plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant knew of the
falsity of the statements or had no reasonable basis for believing them to
be true. Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REV.
1221 (1976).
76. 418 U.S. at 343. For a detailed analysis of a related area, see Note,
An Analysis of the Distinction Between Public Figures and Private Defama-
tion Plaintiffs Applied to Relatives of Public Persons, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
1131 (1976).
77. 418 U.S. at 345.
78. The evidence is set out in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion. 424
U.S. at 484-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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national news coverage, as well as forty-three articles in the Miami
Herald and forty-five articles in the Palm Beach papers. Mrs. Fire-
stone contributed to the publicity by holding several press confer-
ences.
The Court reasoned, however, that Mrs. Firestone was not prom-
inent in the affairs of society outside Palm Beach. Notorious
divorce proceedings are not the sort of "public controversy" referred
to in Gertz.7 9 The Court stressed that Mrs. Firestone had not been
a voluntary participant in the divorce proceedings, but rather she
had been required by law to use the courts to solve her marital dif-
ficulties8 0
This rationale is open to serious criticism. As Justice Marshall
noted, it is beyond the power of any judge to evaluate the
legitimacy of interest in a particular event.81 The Court's function
is not to determine which events are important and thus constitu-
tionally protected. Furthermore, previous cases indicate that first
amendment protections do not turn upon "the truth, popularity, or
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.
'8 2
The ruling in Firestone radically narrows the public figure cate-
gory. The Court insisted upon a strong showing that the plaintiff
had voluntarily injected herself into a public controversy. The
decision indicates that reports about events of a private nature, even
when they occur in the lives of prominent people, are not protected
by constitutional privilege. Few people can be said to voluntarily
involve themselves in controversies concerning such matters. The
best indication of the strictness of the Court's voluntariness test is
the view that Mrs. Firestone's press conferences did not create pub-
lic figure status. Even people who actively seek out the press are
not necessarily public figures under Firestone.
Time's second argument was that reports of judicial proceedings
should be protected by the actual malice standard. This argument
79. Id. at 454.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 488 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Marshall
noted that it was the arbitrary nature of such a decision which led the Gertz
Court to eschew the Rosenbloom public interest test. Id.
82. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1962). See also Buckley v. Lit-
tell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), in which the court stated: "Our constitu-
tion thus contemplates a bias toward unfettered speech at the expense, per-
haps, of compensation for harm to reputation. . . ." Id. at 889.
has support in the common law, for some courts have held that the
privilege of communicating matters of public interest extends to
inaccurate reports. 83 Several justifications for such protection exist.
Reports of judicial proceedings guard against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting courts and court officers to public scrutiny.
8 4
Courts have emphasized that the press must be allowed maximum
freedom to report judicial proceedings.8 5 Also, trial publicity
may draw into court witnesses who are not otherwise known
to the parties.86
Past Supreme Court decisions implied that reports concerning
judicial proceedings were entitled to special protection. As early
as 1947, the Court held that absolute accuracy is not required.
8 7
New York Times suggested that the same rationale underlying
public official protection applied to reports of judicial proceedings.
88
Applying the New York Times standard, the Court in Time, Inc.
v. Pape"0 found a rational interpretation of an ambiguous document
to be privileged. Errors of interpretation were not subject to a
stricter standard of liability than errors of fact 90 After that case,
it seemed certain that reports of judicial proceedings would benefit
by the actual malice standard. 91
The Firestone case presented an ideal fact situation in which to
extend the constitutional privilege to reports of judicial proceedings.
Clearly the divorce decree had been ambiguous and had referred
83. See cases cited in note 27 supra. The common law required a show-
ing of malice when asserting such a privilege, which was very close to the
constitutional privilege urged by Time.
84. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Craig v. Har-
ney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 370-72
(1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
85. E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
86. Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944).
87. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947). At 375 the Court stated: "Cer-
tainly a reporter could not be laid by the heels for contempt because he
missed the essential point in a trial or failed to summarize the issues to
accord with the views of the trial judge." Other cases indicate this view
applies in libel cases. Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (omitting
word alleged amounted to adoption of one of a number of rational interpre-
tations of an ambiguous document); McFarland v. Hearst, 332 F. Supp. 746
(D. Md. 1971); Edmiston v. Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(defendant need not show precisely accurate recounting of court's opinion).
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court stated: "A negligence
test would place on the press the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury
might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it to verify the accuracy
of every reference. .. ." Id. at 389.
88. 376 U.S. at 272-73.
89. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
90. Id. at 290.
91. PnossER, supra note 13, at § 118, at 832.
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to adultery by both parties. The trial court had based the decree
on a ground not recognized in Florida. Furthermore, the formal
ground for the divorce had not been clarified until five years after
Time's report.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to consider judicial pro-
ceedings as a protected category. It argued that such a result would
revive the public interest test 92 and added that accounts of judicial
proceedings neither deserve nor require a constitutional privilege.
9 3
The Firestone rationale emphasized the need to compensate
private plaintiffs. The Court stated that constitutional protection
for reports of judicial proceedings is undeserved and would depre-
ciate the individual's interest in protection from defamatory state-
ments.94 It found the public interest argument unpersuasive,
remarking that reports of most court proceedings add almost noth-
ing toward debate on public issues.95
The Court stated that fair and accurate reports of judicial pro-
ceedings are adequately protected by its decision in Cox Broadcast-
ing v. Cohn.96 In Cox, the father of a rape victim objected to publi-
cation of his daughter's name. He brought an invasion of privacy
action for public disclosure of private facts. The Cox Court held
that accurate reports of judicial proceedings are protected, but
the Firestone Court believed that "inaccurate and defamatory
reports of facts [are] matters deserving no First Amendment
protection .... ,,97
Firestone shows a significant change in the Supreme Court's
analysis. Previous decisions emphasized the public interest in re-
ports of judicial proceedings as a check on the practices of the
courts.9 8 The majority in Firestone attached much less weight to
that public interest. Since New York Times the Supreme Court had
repeatedly granted false statements constitutional protection as the
92. 424 U.S. at 455-60. This statement is puzzling in view of the Court's
willingness to assess the public interest in a particular controversy in order
to determine public figure protection.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 457.
95. Id. However, Firestone is an example of a courtroom battle which
developed into a dispute over the vitality of the first amendment. Amend-
ing the First Amendment, Los Angeles Times, Mar. 21, 1976, pt. IV, at 2,
col. 1.
96. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
97. 424 U.S. at 457.
98. See cases cited in note 84 supra.
price of robust public debate. 9 Judicial proceedings certainly
appear to be within the realm of public debate; nevertheless, the
Court in Firestone stated that false statements deserve no first
amendment protection. Just as Firestone augurs a retreat from
Gertz' negligence standard, the opinion represents a devaluation of
the interest in public debate.
The "Actual Injury" Requirement
In Firestone, all claims for injury to reputation were withdrawn
on the eve of trial. Notwithstanding the absence of evidence con-
cerning reputation, the Firestone Court held that recovery for men-
tal anguish alone is consistent with a defamation action.100 States
may now base awards on elements other than injury to reputation.
The Court cited with approval the Florida jury instruction that
"damages which are a direct and natural result of the alleged libel
may be recovered." 10 Several witnesses testified to Mrs. Firestone's
anxiety over the Time report, and Mrs. Firestone herself testified
that she feared her young son would be adversely affected by the
reports when he grew older. The Court concluded that this was
competent evidence of mental anguish, capable of supporting a
$100,000 judgment. 0 2 That position is inconsistent with Gertz.
In Gertz, as a limit on damages, recovery was restricted to actual
injury. Indeed, Justice White dissented in Gertz because he thought
the requirement of actual injury to reputation reduced considerably
any chance for adequate compensation. 0 3 While Gertz mentioned
mental anguish ts a compensable injury, these damages were
thought to be derivative-recoverable only after the plaintiff estab-
lished either harm to reputation or pecuniary, tangible injury.10 4
99. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
100. 424 U.S. at 460.
101. Id. Although modern tort law has expanded recovery to injured
plaintiffs and abolished traditional immunities for defendants, the first
amendment necessitates a different development in libel law. Justice Doug-
las long argued that no libel law can be constitutional and that the first
amendment is absolute. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 355-56
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
102. 424 U.S. at 460.
103. 418 U.S. at 376. Justice White also argued that it would be almost
impossible for a plaintiff to vindicate his reputation by an award of nominal
damages. But see Murnaghan, From Figment to Fiction to Philosophy-
The Requirement of Proof of Damages in Libel Actions, 22 CAm. U. L, REV.
1 (1972). See also Note, State Tort Actions for Libel After Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.: Is the Balance of Interests Leaning in Favor of the News
Media?, 36 Omio ST. L.J. 697 (1975).
104. Eaton, supra note 12, at 1435-36. See generally Day, Mental Suffer-
ing as an Element of Damages in Defamation Cases, 15 CLEV.-MA . L. REV.
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The dissents in Firestone relied heavily on Gertz. As Justice
Brennan observed, allowing recovery for mental anguish alone "sub-
verts whatever protective influence the 'actual injury' stricture may
possess."'1 5 The dissents argued persuasively that by allowing re-
covery without proof of injury to reputation, the Court was resur-
recting the old rule of presumed damages, supposedly abolished in
Gertz. Viewed in this light, the holding altered the nature of the
protected interest in defamation. Harm to reputation was formerly
measured objectively; the essence of the tort was the plaintiff's
lowered esteem in the community. 1 6 In Firestone, recovery was
allowed for Mrs. Firestone's fears that her young son would be ad-
versely affected by the Time report, even though she introduced no
evidence to support that contention. In this sense, she recovered
for purely subjective harm to her reputation. However, the Court's
language suggested that it found no harm to Mrs. Firestone's repu-
tation.10 7 If the Court did not presume injury to reputation,
it is clearly changing the basis of a defamation action. Mental an-
guish alone may give rise to an action for negligent infliction of
mental distress, but it has not been the basis of a defamation
action.
108
In addition, the result invites gratuitous awards of damages-the
result Gertz sought to avoid. When coupled with the speculative
nature of mental suffering awards, the large award in Firestone in-
dicates that the jury retains wide latitude to punish unpopular
opinions. Strangely, the actual injury requirement, imposed in
Gertz as a limit on damages, operates in Firestone to the benefit of
the libel plaintiff rather than the news media.
26 (1966). See also Arkin & Granquist, The Presumption of General Dam-
ages in the Law of Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUm. L. REV. 1482 (1968).
105. 424 U.S. at 475 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106. HANSON, supra note 16, at § 114 (1969); PROSSER, supra note 13, at
§ 111, at 737. The Supreme Court has said that the primary harm compen-
sated in libel cases is harm to reputation. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
384-85 n.9 (1967).
107. The Court stated: "Florida has obviously decided to permit re-
covery for other injuries without regard to measuring the effect the false-
hood may have had upon a plaintiff's reputation. This does not transform
the action into something other than an action for defamation . " 424
U.S. at 460.
108. Eaton, supra note 12, at 1439. See PROSSER, supra note 13, at § 111,
at 737. A California court has allowed a daughter's claim for negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress against a publisher of a false advertisement
about her mother. Vescovo v. New Way Enterprises, Ltd., 60 Cal. App. 3d
582, 130 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1976).
Firestone shifts the Gertz balance to greatly favor the libel plain-
tiff. Press protections are limited in each area considered. The
negligence standard appears to be little different in practice from
the old rule of strict liability. As for defenses to liability, the use
of the constitutional privilege is sharply limited. Despite clear prec-
edent for extending the privilege to reports of judicial proceedings,
the Court refused to include such reports within the ambit of con-
stitutional privilege. In addition, the new strict interpretation of the
public figure category ensures that few plaintiffs will be hindered
by the actual malice requirement. Finally, fundamental changes in
the area of damages were made. Instead of limiting damages, the
application of the actual injury requirement allows recovery of
large mental suffering awards and permits recovery even to plain-
tiffs who have suffered no injury to their reputations.
Time, Inc. v. Firestone-THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Because Time argued to the Supreme Court that the Florida de-
cision hampered its ability to report news, particularly news of
judicial proceedings, an examination of the effect Firestone will
have on news media practices is appropriate. The Court's decision
will have the greatest impact on court coverage and investigative
reporting.
After Firestone, court coverage becomes exceedingly hazard-
ous. For a number of reasons, reporting court proceedings involves
inherent libel risks. Judicial proceedings are adversary; one person
levels charges at the other, and charges that a person has committed
a crime are generally libelous on their face.109 Moreover, court pro-
ceedings and decrees are often difficult for a reporter to interpret.110
After Firestone, the lay reporter's account of court proceedings must
be strictly accurate, even though the court's language may be
ambiguous. Publishers may require reporters to quote the court's
language or demand to see a copy of the written order if the dead-
line permits. However, in many cases the deadline is so short that
such a procedure is impractical."' Furthermore, in a case like
109. PaossER, supra note 13, at § 112, at 754-56, 763.
110. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 478-79 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). See generally Dennis, Another Look at Press Coverage of the Su-
preme Court, 20 VnL. L. REv. 765 (1975).
111. See Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson-The Issue Is
Control of Press Power, 54 TEx. L. Rsv. 271, 276 n.21 (1976). He suggests
that besides reporters' deadlines, one must also consider the number of edit-
ing and production steps needed and the time and cost of changing the story
during the production process. For a discussion of the increasingly complex
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Firestone, because of its ambiguity, seeing the written order would
not be helpful.
Consider the requirements on the press in a case like Firestone.
First, while working against a deadline, the reporter must obtain a
copy of the decree. Then he must carefully analyze the case for
legal rationale and consistency. Finally, the reporter must antici-
pate what a reviewing court will ultimately decide to be the grounds
for the decision.112 This is no easy task. The Florida courts experi-
enced difficulty identifying the grounds for divorce in Firestone.113
If those courts could not easily determine the grounds for divorce,
it seems unreasonable to require a lay reporter to state the precise
grounds with absolute certainty.
As a result of the risk of libel inherent in court coverage after
Firestone, publishers will be hesitant to print court news.114 Daily
court reporting will surely suffer, although it seems unlikely an
editor would refrain from covering a major trial. The decision will
increase the trend toward specialization in journalism. On large
papers, advanced training and specialization are the norm for re-
porters."15 Science, business, and the environment are areas in
which special knowledge is required. One paper employs a physi-
cian to write medical news,116 and some papers hire lawyers to cover
legal affairs." 7 Unfortunately, those professionals are too costly for
many publishers, and Firestone may force these publishers to drasti-
cally curtail their reporting of judicial proceedings.
Like court coverage, investigative reporting involves great libel
risks. The press' recent coverage of the Watergate scandal is an
technological process involved in mass communications, see Barrow & Ma-
nelli, Communications Technology-A Forecast of Change (pt. 1), 34 LAW
& CONTMIP. PROB. 205 (1969).
112. These arguments are discussed in Brief for Appellant at 26-27, Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
113. See note 72 supra.
114. See Pilpel & Rochett, Supreme Court Ruling in Firestone Case Is
a New Danger to Press Freedom, PuBLIsnER's WEEKLY, Mar. 29, 1976, at
39. On the issue of press self-censorship, see Anderson, supra note 38.
115. J. HOHENBERG, THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALIST 496-517 (3d ed. 1973);
J. HOHENBERG, THE NEWS MEDIA: A JOURNALIST LOOKS AT HIs PROFESSION
297-98 (1968). See BAGDIKIAN, THE INFORmATiON MAcHINES 268-69 (1971);
Riley, Students Benefit from Dual Approach to Master's Degree, 29 JoUR-
NALISM EDUCATOR 36 (1974).
116. Doctor in the House, Nswsw=m, Nov. 11, 1974, at 77.
117. The Los Angeles Times and CBS News have attorneys covering the
Supreme Court.
excellent example of the genre. Investigative reporting goes into
greater depth, is more time consuming, and involves greater re-
search and analysis. 118 It may involve months of research, inter-
viewing, and examining documents. Often the story is hard to un-
cover. Reporters frequently rely on unofficial sources such as pri-
vate individuals and lower level officials."19 These people have ac-
cess to much important information, while official reports are often
self-serving,120 uninformative, or even deliberately misleading.
1 2 1
In the short news story, the reporter goes to the scene of the news-
worthy event, talks with witnesses, verifies names and addresses,
and writes a news report. With investigative pieces, the reporter
must distill the relevant facts from weeks of research and arrange
them to tell the story. The temptation to draw conclusions for the
reader is great.1 22 In addition, many news sources request that they
not be named. In such a case, the report may not be provably true
without revealing confidential sources.
1 23
118. See generally J. HOHENBEIRG, THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNALIST (3d ed.
1973).
119. See, e.g., C. BENSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
65-71, 182-84 (1975).
120. See generally Bagdikian, Congress and the Media: Partners in Prop-
aganda, COLUM. JoURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 1974, at 3; Wicker, The
Greening of the Press, id., May/June 1971, at 7, 12; Comment News-
gathering: A Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53
TEx. L. REV. 1440, 1481-82 (1975).
121. Address by Secretary of State Kissinger at the Annual Meeting of
the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in Wash., D.C. (April 13, 1976),
printed in 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 565 (1976). See Loory, The CIA's Use of
the Press: A "Mighty Wurlitzer," COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Sept./Oct.
1974, at 9; Truth Hurts-Skepticism About Words and Deeds of Public
Officials, TxME, Nov. 24, 1975, at 7 . See also V. MARcHETTI & J. MARKS,
THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE, 47, 161, 301, 335-36 (1974).
122. See Transcript of Proceedings at the Urban Policy Research Institute
on Investigative Reporting, in San Diego, Cal. (morning session, Jan. 10,
1976) (on file with the office of The San Diego Law Review). The libel
risks described in the text were noted by the speakers at the session.
123. The problem of confidential sources is expected to increase in view
of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the Farr case. Bill Farr was
imprisoned for contempt for refusing to reveal his source of inadmissible
witness testimony in the Charles Manson murder trial. The court of ap-
peals denied Farr's petition for habeas corpus, stating that the trial judge's
duty to safeguard the defendant's due process rights outweighed the news-
man's interest in protecting his sources. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3200 (1976). In libel cases, courts have
previously held that it was not necessary to disclose the sources of a de-
famatory article when plaintiff did not show he could meet his burden of
proof. E.g., Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071 (N.D. Cal.
1969), aff'd per curiam, 449 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1971). But cf. Application
of Cepeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (after all other methods of ob-
taining information exhausted, author must reveal sources).
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Firestone compounds the libel risks. In-depth reports often
deal with people who are not public figures under Firestone. Doc-
tors or hospital administrators, for instance, will not be public fig-
ures unless they voluntarily thrust themselves to the forefront of a
public controversy. Nor would an accountant or attorney be a pub-
lic figure even though his or her clients are public officials. In many
investigative pieces the people involved have not voluntarily become
part of a public controversy. Often the investigative piece first
brings the controversy to public attention. Courts have repeatedly
indicated that the media cannot transform a private individual into
a public figure by writing several articles about the person. 24 Con-
sequently, investigative reports involving such people become
extremely hazardous.
The risks will force the media engaged in investigative reporting
to make a cruel choice among three options. The first is simply
to run the risk of libel suits and judgments. This option seems
economically prohibitive, for publishers have suffered numerous
large libel judgments. 125 Moreover, publishers often incur more ex-
pense in defending libel suits than in libel judgments themselves. 2 6
By diluting the negligence standard, limiting defenses, and liberal-
izing the damages rules, Firestone will encourage plaintiffs to file
suits.
The second option is to go to extreme lengths to avoid libel.
Firestone requires extensive investigation into even a short news
item. Time obtained four sources for its brief "Milestones" item,
giving Time no reason to believe the divorce had been granted on
grounds other than those claimed by Russell Firestone. Yet four
sources could not protect Time from a costly lawsuit. To be safe,
reporters must attribute statements to sources, preferably to sup-
124. E.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968); Ar-
ber v. Stahlin, 382 Mich. 300, 302 n.4, 170 N.W.2d 45, 47 n.4 (1969).
125. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) ($3.06 million
reduced by trial court to $450,000); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Church,
537 P.2d 1345 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975) ($485,000 each against newspaper and
its foreign affairs editor); Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 45 Cal.
App. 3d 938, 120 Cal. Rptr. 186 ($150,000), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975);
Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 64 (W. Va.) ($250,000),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975). The cases are collected in Anderson,-supra
note 38, at 435, and Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson-The Is-
sue is Control of Press Power, 54 Tsx. L. REV. 271, 281 n.41 (1976).
126. The defense in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. is reported to have
cost $100,000. Anderson, supra note 38, at 436.
porting documents. 127  However, with many short news items,
time and space limitations preclude that practice. Reliance on docu-
ments will necessitate considerable delay in reporting news, for
many documents are not prepared until long after the event." 3
Quoting documents is also restricted by space limitations; writers
must eventually summarize and interpret the documents they dis-
cover.
In addition to requiring extreme precautionary measures in re-
porting short news items, Firestone may force a shift in reporting
major items. Editors will be hesitant to publish reports which may
subject their publication to suits and liability.12 9 The reluctance
will be especially pronounced when the subject of the article does
not clearly qualify as a public official or figure.13 0 Firestone will
thus encourage the media to concentrate their investigative efforts
on the traditional realms of government and to neglect the consider-
able power often wielded by private individuals.' 3'
The third and final option will be drastic curtailment of press
coverage. Rather than taking elaborate precautions in reporting
short news items, editors will often decide to omit the item alto-
gether.1 32 The Court's contraction of the public figure category will
127. See Transcript, supra note 122, at 13. Attribution to supporting doc-
uments was recommended to those reporters in attendance.
128. Congressional hearings are a prime example of delayed publications.
129. As Professor Anderson states: "The press has virtually no economic
incentive to publish anything that might lead to a libel suit. In the case
of daily newspapers, whatever incentive was once provided by the danger
that a competitor would publish the suppressed material has largely disap-
peared along with the competition." Anderson, supra note 38, at 433. See
also Sterling, Trends in Daily Newspaper and Broadcast Ownership, 1922-
1970, 52 JOURNALISM Q. 247 (1975).
Some may argue that the monopoly position of the press requires even
stricter libel laws. Certainly the press has great power to injure an indi-
vidual. However, Professor Anderson argues persuasively that libel law is
too discriminatory and uncertain to provide a solution to the problem of
press accountability. Anderson, A Response to Professor Robertson-The
Issue is Control of Press Power, 54 Tx. L. Rav. 271, 281-84 (1976). More-
over, large libel judgments make it difficult for any but the monopoly press
institutions to remain profitable. See Kovar, Disturbing Trends in the Law
of Defamation: A Publishing Attorney's Opinion, 3 HASTINGs L.Q. 363
(1976). For an alternative, see Peterson, Press Councils-A Look Towards
the Future, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 487 (1975).
130. Press attorneys caution editors to publish only items which fit into
one of the recognized privileges-for example, fair comment or public figure
protection. P. ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY 74 (4th ed. 1969). See Transcript,
supra note 122, at 15.
131. Professor Anderson noted such a possibility after Gertz and argued
that the result is a constitutional bias in favor of orthodox media. Because
the public/private figure distinction favors more conventional publications
that concentrate on the workings of officialdom, publishers with unpopular
philosophies may receive less protection. Anderson, supra note 38, at 453-
56.
132. See Transcript, supra note 122, at 42. See also McKenna, Time, Inc.
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encourage the media to avoid even major items concerning people
who arguably fall outside that category. If the media choose this
option, the quality of investigative reporting in the United States
will certainly suffer. Investigative reporting performs its most
important function when it aggressively exposes abuses of public
and private power,133 but Firestone may rob investigative reporting
of its courage and aggressiveness. At a minimum, Firestone will
limit quality investigative reporting to major news items concern-
ing people who are indisputably public officials or figures.
CONCLUSION
In Firestone, the Supreme Court subverted the balance it had
carefully constructed in Gertz and expanded recovery to private
persons in several areas. Firestone represents a marked doctrinal
shift which will have serious practical consequences for court cover-
age and investigative reporting. Because of the greater libel risks,
readers can expect less aggressive reporting in these areas. In the
final analysis, such a result harms not only publishers, but also the
public.
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